ื‘ืกืดื“

Kavanot: Phronesis and Akrasia

Thoughts on Tanach and the Davening

Mishlei starts with a 6-pasuk introduction, in which Shlomo summarizes his goal for the ืกืคืจ:

ื‘ ืœื“ืขืช ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ; ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ื ื”ืƒ ื’ ืœืงื—ืช ืžื•ืกืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ; ืฆื“ืง ื•ืžืฉืคื˜ ื•ืžืฉืจื™ืืƒ ื“ ืœืชืช ืœืคืชืื™ื ืขืจืžื”; ืœื ืขืจ ื“ืขืช ื•ืžื–ืžื”ืƒ ื” ื™ืฉืžืข ื—ื›ื ื•ื™ื•ืกืฃ ืœืงื—; ื•ื ื‘ื•ืŸ ืชื—ื‘ืœื•ืช ื™ืงื ื”ืƒ ื• ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžืฉืœ ื•ืžืœื™ืฆื”; ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื•ื—ื™ื“ืชืืƒ ื– ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืจืืฉื™ืช ื“ืขืช; ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ ืื•ื™ืœื™ื ื‘ื–ื•ืƒ

ืžืฉืœื™ ืคืจืง ื

We need to define all these terms. I would assume that they are not simply poetic synonyms, but have significant meanings and distinctions. There are several terms for โ€œwisdomโ€:

and they have meanings that the ืžืคืจืฉื™ื have teased apart, based on context. Those meanings may be different from the ways those words are used elsewhere in ืชื ืดืš. There are also several words for โ€œgood behaviorโ€:

And several words for โ€œone who lacks wisdomโ€

And several words for โ€œwords, textโ€:

It will be interesting to compare ืžืฉืœื™ to the other great source of Western ethics, Aristotleโ€™s Nicomachean Ethics. Much of the philosophical reasoning is similar to ืžืฉืœื™, and Rambam famously uses much of the language of Aristotle to describe Torah ethics, but they are profoundly different. Both agree that human beings need to study and practice โ€œethicsโ€, the right way to behave. However, they are very different in the sense that the ultimate goal, their respective definitions of โ€œrightโ€ are different. Nonetheless, translating Shlomoโ€™s concepts into English warrants some fancy words (and I love fancy words), and those fancy words come from Aristotleโ€™s Greek.

Often, all one needs to do is define an unusual terminology with words derived from the Greek to convince the most difficult to please that one has just entered philosophy.

Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, , p. 122

Shlomo says the basis, the standard by which โ€œright way to behaveโ€ is judged, is ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ:โ€Ž ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืจืืฉื™ืช ื“ืขืช. Aristotle says that the basis is what he calls eudemonia, happiness as the result of an active life governed by reason.

As far as the name [โ€œthe attainment of some goodโ€] goes, we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as Happiness [ฮตแฝฮดฮฑฮนฮผฮฟฮฝฮฏฮฑ], and conceive โ€˜the good lifeโ€™ or โ€˜doing wellโ€™ to be the same thing as โ€˜being happyโ€™.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 4, Section 2

The purpose of ethics is so we will know how to live a satisfied life. Shlomo says otherwise:

ืกื•ืฃ ื“ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ืœ ื ืฉืžืข; ืืช ื”ืืœืงื™ื ื™ืจื ื•ืืช ืžืฆื•ืชื™ื• ืฉืžื•ืจ ื›ื™ ื–ื” ื›ืœ ื”ืื“ืืƒ

ืงื”ืœืช ื™ื‘:ื™ื’

We start with ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ and strive for the ultimate purpose, which is coming closer to ื”ืงื‘ืดื” and bringing the world closer to ื”ืงื‘ืดื”. The Ramchal quotes the gemara:

ืืดืจ ืคื ื—ืก ื‘ืŸ ื™ืื™ืจ: ืชื•ืจื” ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื–ื”ื™ืจื•ืช ื–ื”ื™ืจื•ืช ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื–ืจื™ื–ื•ืช ื–ืจื™ื–ื•ืช ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื ืงื™ื•ืช ื ืงื™ื•ืช ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ืคืจื™ืฉื•ืช ืคืจื™ืฉื•ืช ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื˜ื”ืจื” ื˜ื”ืจื” ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื—ืกื™ื“ื•ืช ื—ืกื™ื“ื•ืช ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ืขื ื•ื” ืขื ื•ื” ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ื™ืจืืช ื—ื˜ื ื™ืจืืช ื—ื˜ื ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ืงื“ื•ืฉื” ืงื“ื•ืฉื” ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ืจื•ื— ื”ืงื•ื“ืฉ ืจื•ื— ื”ืงื•ื“ืฉ ืžื‘ื™ืื” ืœื™ื“ื™ ืชื—ื™ื™ืช ื”ืžืชื™ื

ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื–ืจื” ื›,ื‘

ืึทืšึฐ ื”ึทืงึผึธื“ื•ึนืฉื ื”ึทื“ึผึธื‘ึตืง ืชึผึธืžึดื™ื“ ืœึตืืœึนืงึธื™ื•, ื•ึฐื ึทืคึฐืฉืื•ึน ืžึดืชึฐื”ึทืœึผึถื›ึถืช ื‘ึผึตื™ืŸ ื”ึทืžึผึปืฉื‚ึฐื›ึผึธืœื•ึนืช ื”ึธืึฒืžึดืชึผึดื™ึผื•ึนืช ื‘ึผึฐืึทื”ึฒื‘ึทืช ื‘ึผื•ึนืจึฐืื•ึน ื•ึฐื™ึดืจึฐืึธืชื•ึน, ื”ึดื ึผึตื” ื ึถื—ึฐืฉืึธื‘ ืœื•ึน ื›ึผึฐืึดืœึผื•ึผ ื”ื•ึผื ืžึดืชึฐื”ึทืœึผึตืšึฐ ืœึดืคึฐื ึตื™ ื”ืณ ื‘ึผึฐืึทืจึฐืฆื•ึนืช ื”ึทื—ึทื™ึผึดื™ื ืขื•ึนื“ึถื ึผื•ึผ ืคึผึนื” ื‘ึผึธืขื•ึนืœึธื ื”ึทื–ึผึถื”.

ืžืกื™ืœืช ื™ืฉืจื™ื ื›ื•

We are going to spend some time teasing apart the first pasuk of the introduction:

ืœื“ืขืช ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ; ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ื ื”ืƒ

ืžืฉืœื™ ื:ื‘

ื“ืขืช

Shlomo wants us to know, ืœื“ืขืช, but ื“ืขืช is not just knowledge but โ€œintimate knowledgeโ€, felt as well as thought.

ื•ื”ืื“ื ื™ื“ืข ืืช ื—ื•ื” ืืฉืชื•; ื•ืชื”ืจ ื•ืชืœื“ ืืช ืงื™ืŸ ื•ืชืืžืจ ืงื ื™ืชื™ ืื™ืฉ ืืช ื”ืณืƒ

ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ื“:ื

ื›ื™ ื™ื“ืขืชื™ื• ืœืžืขืŸ ืืฉืจ ื™ืฆื•ื” ืืช ื‘ื ื™ื• ื•ืืช ื‘ื™ืชื• ืื—ืจื™ื• ื•ืฉืžืจื• ื“ืจืš ื”ืณ ืœืขืฉื•ืช ืฆื“ืงื” ื•ืžืฉืคื˜ ืœืžืขืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ื ื”ืณ ืขืœ ืื‘ืจื”ื ืืช ืืฉืจ ื“ื‘ืจ ืขืœื™ื•ืƒ

ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ื™ื—:ื™ื˜

ื•ืžื‘ื•ืืจ ืืฆืœื ื•โ€ฆืฉื“ืขืช ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืžื” ืฉื”ื•ืงื‘ืข ื‘ื ืคืฉื• ื‘ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืจื•ืจื”, ื›ืžื• ืžื” ืฉืžืฉื™ื’ ืขืดื™ ื”ื—ื•ืฉื™ื ื•ื”ืžื•ืฉื›ืœื•ืช ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช, ืื• ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืจื’ืฉืช ื”ื ืคืฉื™ื•ืช, ื•ืžื–ื” ื‘ื ืœืฉื•ืŸ ื“ืขืช ืขืœ ื”ืจื’ืฉืช ื”ื ืคืฉ.

ืžืœื‘ื™ืดื, ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ื‘:ื˜, ื“ืดื” ืขืฅ ื”ื“ืขืช ื˜ื•ื‘ ื•ืจืข

ื“ืขืช is something known to both heart and mind, or, in the terms of ืชื”ื™ืœื™ื,โ€Ž ื›ืœื™ื•ืช ื•ืœื‘:

ื‘ื—ื ื ื™ ื”ืณ ื•ื ืกื ื™; ืฆืจืคื” ื›ืœื™ื•ืชื™ ื•ืœื‘ื™ืƒ

ืชื”ื™ืœื™ื ื›ื•:ื‘

And that is the main goal of ืกืคืจ ืžืฉืœื™: to turn ื—ื›ืžื” into ื“ืขืช.

Rabbi Elya Lopian (1876-1970) described Mussar as โ€œteaching the heart what the mind already understandsโ€.

Greg Marcus, What Is Mussar?

Just knowing doesnโ€™t automatically get translated into action, as we noted above.

As Rav Wolpe says in the introduction to ืขืœื™ ืฉื•ืจ:

ื”ื‘ื ืช ื”ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืชืชื›ืŸ ืืš ื•ืจืง ื›ื“ื™ ืขืฉื™ื™ืชื ืœืžืขืฉื”, ื•ื‘ืœื™ืžื•ื“ ืœื‘ื“ ืœื ื™ื‘ื™ื ื• ื‘ื”ื ื›ืœื•ื, ื•ื”ื”ืชืจืฉืžื•ืช ืžื”ื ื•ื”ื“ื™ื•ืŸ ืขืœื™ื”ื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืœื™ืžื•ื“ื ืœื‘ื“ ื”ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื ื•ืžื‘ื•ื˜ืœื™ื.

ืจื‘ ืฉืœืžื” ื•ื•ืœื‘ื”, ืขืœื™ ืฉื•ืจ, ื—ืœืง ื‘ืณ, ื”ืงื“ืžื”

ื—ื›ืžื”

And what we are supposed to know is ื—ื›ืžื” and ืžื•ืกืจ.โ€Ž ื—ื›ืžื” means โ€œwisdomโ€ but here it has a very specific meaning.

ื’ื“ืจ ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ื”ื•ื ืœื“ืขืช ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืžื™ื“ื•ืช ื•ื”ื“ืจื›ื™ื ื•ื”ืžื ื”ื’ื™ื, ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื›ืœ ืื—ื“ ืžื”ื ืฉื ื™ ื“ืจื›ื™ื ื”ืคื•ื›ื™ื ื–ื” ืžื–ื”, ื›ืžื• ืื›ื–ืจื™ื•ืช-ืจื—ืžื™ื, ื’ืื•ื”-ืขื ื•ื”, ืขื–ื•ืช-ื‘ื•ืฉืช, ืื›ื™ืœื”-ืฆื•ื, ืงื“ื•ืฉื”-ื˜ื•ืžืื”, ืฉื”ื ื”ื’ื” ืขืดืค ื“ืจืš ืื—ื“ ื”ื™ื ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ื”ื™ืคื•ื›ื” ืกื›ืœื•ืช, ืœืžืฉืœ: ืœื”ืชื ื”ื’ ื‘ืขื ื•ื” ื”ื™ื ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืœื”ืชื ื”ื’ ื‘ื’ืื•ื” ื”ื•ื ืกื›ืœื•ืช. ื•ืœืคืขืžื™ื ื”ื’ืื•ื” ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ื”ืขื ื•ื” ืกื›ืœื•ืช, ื›ืžื• ื ื’ื“ ืจืฉืขื™ื ื•ื–ื“ื™ื.

ืžืœื‘ื™ืดื, ืžืฉืœื™ ื:ื‘

The English word for this type of wisdom is โ€œphronesisโ€.

Phronesisโ€ฆis a type of wisdom or intelligence relevant to practical action. It implies both good judgment and excellence of character and habitsโ€ฆIn Aristotelian ethics, the concept was distinguished from other words for wisdom and intellectual virtuesโ€ฆbecause of its practical character.

Wikipedia, Phronesis

This is the wisdom that Shlomo asked for when ื”ืณ offered him anything he wanted.

ื•ื ืชืช ืœืขื‘ื“ืš ืœื‘ ืฉืžืข ืœืฉืคื˜ ืืช ืขืžืš ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื˜ื•ื‘ ืœืจืข; ื›ื™ ืžื™ ื™ื•ื›ืœ ืœืฉืคื˜ ืืช ืขืžืš ื”ื›ื‘ื“ ื”ื–ื”ืƒ

ืžืœื›ื™ื ื ื’:ื˜

Relevant to this, there is an interesting philosophical question. Is it possible to know the right thing to do and still not do it? Can you act against your own best judgement? Plato says you canโ€™t; if youโ€™ve decided to do something, then, by definition, that was your best judgement.

[Socrates:] [P]eople think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by something elseโ€”now by passion, now by pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about knowledge is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other force. Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succor for mankind?โ€ฆ

For you have admitted that it is from defect of knowledge that men err, when they do err, in their choice of pleasures and painsโ€”that is, in the choice of good and evil; and from defect not merely of knowledge but of the knowledge which you have now admitted also to be that of measurement. And surely you know well enough for yourselves that the erring act committed without knowledge is done through ignorance. Accordingly โ€œto be overcome by pleasureโ€ means just thisโ€”ignorance in the highest degree.

Plato, Protagoras

In other words, if you make a bad choice (like eating that fourth donut from the break room) then you obviously donโ€™t really know how miserable you are going to feel later. But we all have the intuitive sense (as Socrates starts out by saying) that heโ€™s wrong. We are not governed by our intellectual knowledge. Our minds donโ€™t make decisions, our hearts do (โ€œheartโ€ and โ€œmindโ€ are metaphors here for intellectual and emotional self). The mind is only one input that affects our decisions.

The kidneys (the symbol for mind) is called ืขึธืฆึถื” in the Torah because they donโ€™t decide, they only advise.

ื•ื”ืงืจื™ื‘ ืžื–ื‘ื— ื”ืฉืœืžื™ื ืืฉื” ืœื”ืณ ื—ืœื‘ื• ื”ืืœื™ื” ืชืžื™ืžื” ืœืขืžืช ื”ืขืฆื” ื™ืกื™ืจื ื”; ื•ืืช ื”ื—ืœื‘ ื”ืžื›ืกื” ืืช ื”ืงืจื‘ ื•ืืช ื›ืœ ื”ื—ืœื‘ ืืฉืจ ืขืœ ื”ืงืจื‘ืƒ

ื•ื™ืงืจื ื’:ื˜

ืœืขืžืช ื”ืขืฆื”: ืœืžืขืœื” ืžืŸ ื”ื›ืœื™ื•ืช ื”ื™ื•ืขืฆื•ืช.

ืจืฉืดื™, ื•ื™ืงืจื ื’:ื˜

Aristotle points out that Plato is clearly wrong, because knowledge is not the same as action.

Now we may ask how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strangeโ€”so Socrates thoughtโ€”if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and โ€œdrag it about like a slaveโ€. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, when he judges acts against what he judges bestโ€”people act so only by reason of ignorance. Now this view plainly contradicts the observed factsโ€ฆ

[W]ithin the case of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk. The fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothingโ€ฆ

Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics VII:3

The word that is translated here as โ€œincontinentโ€ is, in Greek, แผ€ฮบฯฮฑฯƒฮฏฮฑ. โ€Incontinentโ€œ is a literal translation, meaning โ€œwithout controlโ€, but means something else entirely in modern English. We will simply use the word โ€œakrasiaโ€.

akrasia (or acrasia)

Lack of self-control; excess; intemperance.

Wikitionary, akrasia

And I would say that Shlomo has a word for this as well.

ื‘ ืœื“ืขืช ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ; ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ื ื”ืƒ โ€ฆ ื– ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืจืืฉื™ืช ื“ืขืช; ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ ืื•ื™ืœื™ื ื‘ื–ื•ืƒ

ืžืฉืœื™ ืคืจืง ื

The ืื•ื™ืœ is one of ืžืฉืœื™'s โ€œfoolsโ€. The goal of ืžืฉืœื™ is ืœื“ืขืช ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ, to integrate phronesis and discipline (which is how I will translate ืžื•ืกืจ; more on that later). But the ืื•ื™ืœ refuses to integrate them (ื‘ื–ื•โ€”scorns), and is left in that state of akrasia. They know the right way to act, but let their passions rule them. And the reason for this is that they lack ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ. Without ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ, Socratic knowlege will not affect behavior.

ืืžื ื, ื”ืื•ื™ืœื™ื (ืฉื’ื“ืจ ื”ืื•ื™ืœ ื”ื•ื ื”ืžืกืชืคืง ื•ื‘ืœืชื™ ืžืืžื™ืŸ [ืžืฉื•ืจืฉ โ€ืื•ืœื™โ€œ]), ืฉื”ื ืžื˜ื™ืœื™ื ืกืคืงื•ืช, ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ื—ื›ืžื”, ื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืฉื”ื•ื ื”ืžื•ืกืจ ืฉื”ื™ื ืจืืฉื™ืช ื•ื™ืกื•ื“ ื“ืขืช ื”ื—ื›ืžื”, ื”ื ืžื‘ื–ื™ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืžื•ืกืจ.

ื•ื–ื”ื• ืฉืืžืจ ืฉืื•ื™ืœื™ื ื‘ื–ื• ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ, ืžืคื ื™ ืฉื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืจืืฉื™ืช ื“ืขืช, ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื•ืžืจ, ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืœื—ื›ืžื” ื”ืชื—ืœื” ืื—ืจืช ืœื“ืขืช ืื•ืชื” ื•ืœื”ืฉื™ื’ ืžืžื ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืจื•ืจื”, ืจืง ืขืœ-ื™ื“ื™ ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ, ืฉื–ื” ื‘ื ื•ื™ ืขืœ ืืžื•ื ื” ื‘ื”ืณ ื•ื‘ื—ื•ืงื™ ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ืฉื‘ืื• ืžืื™ืชื•, ืืฉืจ ื”ื ืžืกืชืคืงื™ื ื‘ื›ืœ ื–ื” ื•ืžื‘ื–ื™ื ืืช ื”ืžื•ืกืจ ื•ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ ืขื ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ืฉื ืฉืขื ืช ืขืœื™ื”.

ืžืœื‘ื™ืดื, ืžืฉืœื™ ื:ื–

ืžื•ืกืจ

The other thing that Shlomo wants us to know is ืžื•ืกืจ, which we usually just transliterate as Mussar, perhaps translating it as โ€œcharacter developmentโ€. It sounds like it should be related to ืžืกื•ืจื”, transmission.

ืžืฉื” ืงื‘ืœ ืชื•ืจื” ืžืกื™ื ื™, ื•ืžืกืจื” ืœื™ื”ื•ืฉืข, ื•ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืœื–ืงื ื™ื, ื•ื–ืงื ื™ื ืœื ื‘ื™ืื™ื, ื•ื ื‘ื™ืื™ื ืžืกืจื•ื” ืœืื ืฉื™ ื›ื ืกืช ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื”.

ืžืฉื ื” ืื‘ื•ืช ื:ื

But that word is not in ืชื ืดืš at all; it is Mishnaic Hebrew. ืžื•ืกืจ comes from the root ื™ืกืจ, to discipline with explicit meaning of negative reinforcement. ืžื•ืกืจ is the unpleasant outcome of wrong behavior, or a warning about what is to come.

ืžืŸ ื”ืฉืžื™ื ื”ืฉืžื™ืขืš ืืช ืงืœื• ืœื™ืกืจืš; ื•ืขืœ ื”ืืจืฅ ื”ืจืืš ืืช ืืฉื• ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ืฉืžืขืช ืžืชื•ืš ื”ืืฉืƒ

ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื“:ืœื•

ื•ื™ื“ืขืช ืขื ืœื‘ื‘ืš; ื›ื™ ื›ืืฉืจ ื™ื™ืกืจ ืื™ืฉ ืืช ื‘ื ื• ื”ืณ ืืœืงื™ืš ืžื™ืกืจืšืƒ

ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื—:ื”

ื•ืžื”ื• ื”ืžื•ืกืจ? ื™ื‘ื•ืืจ ืœืงืžืŸ (ืžืฉืœื™ ื˜ื•:ืœื’): ื™ึดืจึฐืึทืช ื”ืณ ืžื•ึผืกึทืจ ื—ื‡ื›ึฐืžึธื”, ืฉื›ื•ื— ื”ื™ืจืื” ื”ื ื˜ื•ืข ื‘ื ืคืฉ, ืžืกืชืขืฃ ืžืžื ื• ืกืขื™ืฃ ืื—ื“ ืฉื”ื•ื ื™ืจืืช ื”ืณ, ืฉื”ื™ื ืชืืกื•ืจ ื›ื•ื—ื•ืช ื ืคืฉื• ื‘ืขื‘ื•ืชื•ืช ื‘ืœ ื™ืคืจืฆื• ื—ื•ืง, ื›ื™ ื‘ืืฉืจ ื™ืืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืณ ื•ื™ื•ื“ืข ื›ื™ ื—ืงื™ ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ื”ื ื ืชื•ื ื™ื ืžื”ืณ, ื™ื™ืจื ืžื”ืณ ืžื›ื‘ื•ื“ื• ื•ื’ื“ืœื• ืžืžืฉืคื˜ื• ื•ืขื ืฉื•, ื•ื™ืคื—ื“ ืžืœืกื•ืจ ืžื—ืงื™ ื”ื—ื›ืžื” ืืฉืจ ืฆื•ื” ื•ื”ื–ื”ื™ืจ ืขืœื™ื”ื ืžืœืš ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ ืจื ื•ื ืฉื.

ืžืœื‘ื™ืดื, ืžืฉืœื™ ื:ื‘

ื—ื›ืžื” is knowing the right way to act. ืžื•ืกืจ is knowing the consequences of the wrong way to act.

Contrast clarifies. Light only has meaning in the context of darkness. The stronger the distinction, the more potent the appreciation and happiness.

โ€ฆThis is true of emotion as well as morality. By seeing the stark difference between what is right and wrong, the message is clear. Shlomo HaMelech uses this model throughout Mishlei. This is the โ€œunderstanding of knowledge and mussarโ€ that our pasuk is referring to.

Rabbi Dovid Morris, Mishlei Chapters 1-5: Metaphors for Living. p. 8

But ืžื•ืกืจ in this sense is not punitive; it is educational.

ื™ ื”ื™ืกืจ ื’ื•ื™ื ื”ืœื ื™ื•ื›ื™ื—; ื”ืžืœืžื“ ืื“ื ื“ืขืชืƒ ื™ื ื”ืณ ื™ื“ืข ืžื—ืฉื‘ื•ืช ืื“ื; ื›ื™ ื”ืžื” ื”ื‘ืœืƒ ื™ื‘ ืืฉืจื™ ื”ื’ื‘ืจ ืืฉืจ ืชื™ืกืจื ื• ื™ื”; ื•ืžืชื•ืจืชืš ืชืœืžื“ื ื•ืƒ

ืชื”ื™ืœื™ื ืคืจืง ืฆื“

ื‘ื™ื ื”

And then Shlomo says that he want to teach us ืœื”ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ื ื”; redundantly, โ€œto understand words of understandingโ€. ื‘ื™ื ื” (from the root ื‘ื ื”, โ€œto buildโ€) is different from ื—ื›ืžื”. It means analysis, deduction.

ื—ื›ืžื”: ืžื” ืฉืื“ื ืฉื•ืžืข ืžืื—ืจื™ื ื•ืœืžื“.

ืชื‘ื•ื ื”: ืžื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจ ืžืœื‘ื• ืžืชื•ืš ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืฉืœืžื“.

ืจืฉืดื™, ืฉืžื•ืช ืœื:ื’

ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื•ื ื‘ื ื™ื: ืžื‘ื™ื ื™ื ื“ื‘ืจ ืžืชื•ืš ื“ื‘ืจ. ื–ื• ื”ื™ื ืฉืฉืืœ ืืจื™ื•ืก ืืช ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœื ื‘ื•ื ื™ื? ื—ื›ื ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืฉืœื—ื ื™ ืขืฉื™ืจ, ื›ืฉืžื‘ื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื“ื™ื ืจื™ืŸ ืœืจืื•ืช ืจื•ืื”, ื•ื›ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžื‘ื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ื•ืชื•ื”ื, ื ื‘ื•ืŸ ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืฉืœื—ื ื™ ืชื’ืจ, ื›ืฉืžื‘ื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžืขื•ืช ืœืจืื•ืช ืจื•ืื”, ื•ื›ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžื‘ื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื•, ื”ื•ื ืžื—ื–ืจ ื•ืžื‘ื™ื ืžืฉืœื•.

ืจืฉืดื™, ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื:ื™ื’

Simply learning the ืžืฉืœื™ื here, even internalizing the messages, is not enough. There is no way that a finite text could encompass every possible situation. You have to be able to extend, to go from the ื—ื›ืžื” ื•ืžื•ืกืจ into new areas. So part of the goal of ืกืคืจ ืžืฉืœื™ is ืืžืจื™ ื‘ื™ื ื”, tools for building.