This week’s parsha recapitulates the laws of kashrut, and those end with:
What is a נבלה? Artscroll translates it as:
But that means “don’t eat any dead animal”. Since אבר מן החי is also forbidden, it sounds like G-d wants us to be vegetarians. But I’m not going to accept that.
So Artscroll explains what we already know, that נְבֵלָה means “a carcass, but not if it died according to the rules”:
But those rules are not specified in the Torah. They are part of the תורה שבעל פה, and we believe that those rules were given to Moshe at הר סיני along with the text of the תורה שבכתב.
And we know that we are allows to eat meat, since this week’s parsha explicitly says so:
It’s worth noting that זבח means to “butcher”, to kill an animal for its meat. שחט means specifically to slit the neck, and that isn’t mentioned at all in our paragraph.
However, the text tells us וזבחת…כאשר צויתך, which implies that there are rules for זביחה:
This is the one place where the תורה שבכתב tells us that it is incomplete (there is no other part of the Torah that has הלכות זביחה), that there must be another source of laws. In effect, the תורה שבכתב is incorporating the entire תורה שבעל פה by reference.
In American law, this makes understanding any given law impossible. Here’s an example, from the recent St. Louis county mask mandate:
I was curious how those who don’t believe in תורה שבעל פה interpret כאשר צויתיך.
And Shadal, trying to read פשט, without interpreting in the light of the תורה שבעל פה, says something similar:
In other words, at the פשט level, כאשר צויתיך must refer to other laws mentioned in the text of תורה שבכתב. It cannot refer to another body of law, since that is not part of the hermeneutic background of פשט. That’s the question I want to focus on here: does the פשט here mandate the existence of extra-textual Divine laws?
And as an aside, Karaites do have rules for slaughtering; actually they are more stringent than the halacha:
They just believe it is tradition rather than Divinely mandated, I think. I’m not a Karaite theologian.
What’s interesting is that Ramban (who clearly believed that ה׳ gave us the תורה שבעל פה, and that the laws of שחיטה are הלכות ממשה מסיני) also reads כאשר צויתיך to refer to other laws mentioned explicitly:
So כאשר צויתיך means “slaughter your animals for [secular] food just as you have been commanded to slaughter the animals for sacrifices”:
Similarly, the Netziv:
So they are taking two steps: כאשר צויתיך refers to the previous rules about שחיטה, which come from the תורה שבעל פה, but they are saying that the laws are
explictly not being included by reference. The existence of תורה שבעל פה is implied, but is never explicitly mentioned in the תורה שבכתב.
I think the reason for this relates to a דרש of the Bais HaLevi. If כאשר צויתך refers to the תורה שבעל פה, then that תורה שבעל פה is “discoverable” in the legal sense.
If כאשר צויתך refers to something outside the Torah, then reading the Torah would require reading this other text, the תורה שבעל פה. And we don’t want to imply that there is “another text”. תורה שבעל פה is not a text, it is a מסורה.
The Bais HaLevi starts with the midrash:
תורה שבעל פה represents our relationship with הקב״ה.
I think that the issue is not so much that we don’t want the goyim to have this special treasure, but that they would treat it as yet another book. And that applies to us as well. Even though the Talmud has been written down, it can’t be “read”. It has to be “learned”.
Then the Bais HaLevi brings the aggadah that the first לוחות included, in some mystical way, everything: all the תורה שבעל פה and all the תורה שבעל פה. There would have been no מסורה בעל פה.
But with the לוחות שניות, our relationship to the Torah changed:
תורה שבכתב can be treated like a book. But the existence of תורה שבעל פה means that Torah only exists in the minds of כנסת ישראל. כאשר צויתך cannot mean that there’s another book laying around that we can casually read. תורה שבעל פה must be internalized.
And so we become in effect the קלף on which the תורה שבעל פה is written.